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We show that a steeply increasing workload before a deadline is com-
patible with time-consistent preferences. The key departure from the
literature is that we consider a stochastic environment where success
of eﬀort is not guaranteed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Life is full of tasks which have to be completed by a prespeciﬁed date. People
sometimes delay the completion of such tasks.1 Their workload is steeply
increasing before the deadline. The literature explains this phenomenon by
use of time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999, 2001, 2007; Akerlof, 1991; Brocas and Carrillo, 2001). In contrast,
typical models with time consistency predict that a person distributes her
eﬀort equally across time (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2007). Because of dis-
counting, a time-consistent person may optimally choose a slightly increasing
workload (Fischer, 2001). However,“quantitatively, the fully rational model
appears to require an extremely high rate of time preference or elasticity
of intertemporal substitution to generate serious procrastination” (Fischer,
2001, p. 249). That is, a steeply increasing workload is seen as incompatible
with the time consistency assumption.
We show that in a stochastic environment, where success of eﬀort is
not guaranteed, a time-consistent person may optimally choose a steeply
increasing workload. Therefore, we provide—to the best of our knowledge—
the ﬁrst explanation why a steeply increasing workload can be fully rational.
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1See Ellis and Knaus (1977), Solomon and Rothblum (1984), McCown et al. (1987),
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2 THE MODEL
The person has to solve some task within T ≥ 2 periods. In every period
t ∈ {1,...,T}, she chooses how much eﬀort pt she wants to invest. We
measure eﬀort in units of success, so pt ∈ [0,1]. The eﬀort costs in period
t are c = f(pt). We suppose that zero eﬀort is costless, f(0) = 0, and that
eﬀort costs are increasing and convex: f′(pt) > 0 for all pt > 0 and f′′(pt) > 0
for all pt. To guarantee inner solutions we suppose that f′(0) = 0. We denote
the expected eﬀort costs of solving the task under the optimal strategy, given
that the task is not solved at the beginning of period t, by Et[C].
3 ANALYSIS
When the task is not solved at the beginning of period T, the person has to
make sure that the task is solved in T and therefore chooses eﬀort p∗
T = 1.
In period t < T, and when the task is not yet solved, the person minimizes
the expected eﬀorts cost of a solution
Et[C] = f(p
∗
t) + (1 − p
∗
t)Et+1[C] (1)




t) − Et+1[C] = 0. (2)
With p∗




T) which the person chooses when the task is not yet solved. When the
task is solved, it is optimal to choose zero eﬀort.
From (2) we see that the person invests more, the higher are the expected









We now show that Et[C] < Et+1[C] ∀t ≤ T −1. We start with t = T −1.
Rewrite (1) as














because f(pT−1)/pT−1 is then small,2 while ET[C] = f(1). Note that the
person need not choose a small pT−1; but because she minimizes ET−1[C],
2More precisely, due to convexity of f, 0 ≤
f(p)
p < f′(p) and hence limp→0
f(p)
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(4) and (5) imply that ET−1[C] < ET[C] must hold. The same steps can be
repeated for period t = T − 2 and so on.






t+1, ∀t ≤ T − 1. (6)
First, ET−1[C] < ET[C], ET[C] = f(1), and (4) imply that p∗
T−1 < p∗
T = 1.
Second, the ﬁnding that Et[C] < Et+1[C] for all t ≤ T − 1 implies, together
with (3), that p∗
t < p∗
t+1 ∀t ≤ T − 2. Finally, pt = 0 would imply, see (1),
Et[C] = Et+1[C], which cannot hold.
The assumption that f′(p) > 0 for p > 0 and (6) imply that eﬀort costs





t+1), ∀t ≤ T − 1. (7)
The next proposition summarizes.
P ro p o s i t i o n 1: Given that the task is not yet solved, the workload,
f(p∗
t), is increasing over time.
The intuition is as follows. Shortly before the deadline, solving the task
becomes urgent and the person consequently invests a lot of eﬀort. In early
periods, the person could also decide to invest a lot of eﬀort and therefore
likely solve the task then already. However, this is not optimal. Rather, the
person optimally invests little eﬀort to solve the task possibly for low eﬀort
costs.3 Therefore, the option of solving the task in later periods provides
incentives for the person to try to solve the task with little eﬀort in early
periods.
As a concrete example, suppose that a schoolchild has to complete a
homework within two days. If the work is not completed on day 1, the child
has to invest a lot of eﬀort on day 2 to complete the work for sure. For
example, the child may do its homework independently, which causes high
eﬀort costs. On day 1, the child optimally invests less eﬀort to minimize
the expected eﬀort costs of solving the task. For example, the child may






3Notice that for low levels of eﬀort the likelihood of success is large relative to the
eﬀort costs: p/f(p) is decreasing in p due to f(0) = 0 and f′′ > 0. Loosely speaking,
investing little eﬀort gives the person a lot of “bang for the buck”.WEINSCHENK: INCREASING WORKLOAD IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT 4
with α > 0, γ > 1, and p ∈ [0,1]. Since the expected costs of a solution
Et[C] are also linear in α, we can normalize α = 1.
Figure 1 shows for selected values of γ how the optimal eﬀort, the eﬀort
costs, and the expected costs of a solution evolve over a timespan of 10
periods.4 The diagrams illustrate that a steeply increasing workload can
be optimal. It is hard to qualify what “steeply” means. Nevertheless, we
think that, for example, the quadrupling of the eﬀort costs f(p∗
t) from the
penultimate to the last period in the quadratic cost speciﬁcation (γ = 2)
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F i g u r e 1: Examples with γ = 1.5 (top left), γ = 2 (top right), γ =
3 (bottom left), and γ = 5 (bottom right); p∗
t (blue circles), f(p∗
t) (red
squares), and Et[C] (green triangles).
5 CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS
We oﬀered a simple model where the success of eﬀort is stochastic and
showed that a person with time-consistent preferences may optimally choose
a steeply increasing workload before a deadline. We next show that this re-
sult also holds when we consider (i) discounting and (ii) a setting where
solving the task is no longer mandatory but instead rewarded.
4When a shorter horizon, T < 10, is considered, one has to cut oﬀ the ﬁrst 10 − T
periods of the diagrams.WEINSCHENK: INCREASING WORKLOAD IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT 5
5.1 DISCOUNTING
What happens when future costs are discounted with factor δ ∈ (0,1)? We
consider the simple case where f(p) = pγ and T = 2. In t = 2, the person
chooses p∗
2 = 1. In t = 1, she minimizes, cf. (1),
p
γ
1 + δ(1 − p1)1 (9)










Observe that discounting has a negative impact on p∗
1, which makes the
workload even more sharply increasing over time. Because p∗
1 is continuous
in δ, discount factors close to 1 lead to results which are quantitatively very
similar to the ones without discounting.
5.2 REWARD
Some real-world situations may be better described by assuming that a task
does not have to be solved for sure, but rather that solving it is rewarded (or
equivalently, that failure is punished). Let the reward for solving the task
within the deadline be R > 0. We consider the case where T = 2. In t = 2,
the person is no longer forced to choose p2 = 1. She maximizes the expected
reward minus her eﬀort costs:
max
p2
p2R − f(p2). (11)
If R ≥ f′(1) the person chooses to solve the task for sure: p∗






2) = R. (12)
In t = 1, she maximizes the expected reward minus her eﬀort costs and also
takes into account that by solving the task now she foregoes the continuation
payoﬀ of eventually solving the task in period 2:
max
p1





We now prove that p∗
1 < p∗




2 is smaller than 1 and solves (12). The ﬁrst-order condition of (13)
is
f





Comparing (12) and (14) clariﬁes that p∗
1 cannot exceed p∗
2 because the
continuation payoﬀ is positive (due to 0 = f′(0) < R). The same line of
arguments implies that p∗
1 = p∗
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whenever p∗
2 = 1, we have p∗
1 < 1. If p∗
2 = 1, the continuation payoﬀ of
reaching period 2, when the task is not solved yet solved, is R−f(1). Using
this result, we see from (14) that p∗
1 = 1 requires
f
′(1) ≤ f(1), (15)
which cannot hold, given the assumptions made on f. Because eﬀort costs
are increasing, p∗
1 < p∗





Here are the numerical data of the T = 10 example for diﬀerent values of
γ. The calculations were made with the software Microsoft Excel. E0[f(p∗
t)]
denotes the unconditional expected eﬀort costs of period t, from the perspec-
tive of period 0. The tables reveal that also the unconditional expected eﬀort
costs (which can be interpreted as the expected workloads) are increasing
over time. Simulations show that this result holds more generally.
t pt f(pt) E0[f(p∗
t)] Et[C]
1 0.120588060 0.041875158 0.041875158 0.499949295
2 0.131937950 0.047924170 0.042145087 0.520886874
3 0.145757348 0.055647504 0.042480421 0.544848959
4 0.162985877 0.065799858 0.042909093 0.572672711
5 0.185129507 0.079655078 0.043478108 0.605572640
6 0.214783103 0.099540580 0.044273711 0.645400179
7 0.256896533 0.130207909 0.045475005 0.695170469
8 0.322511812 0.183154856 0.047533864 0.760274424
9 0.444444444 0.296296296 0.052096990 0.851851852
10 1 1 0.097681856 1
Ta b l e 1: γ = 1.5.
t pt f(pt) E0[f(p∗
t)] Et[C]
1 0.150178593 0.022553610 0.022553610 0.277803576
2 0.163553460 0.026749734 0.022732497 0.300357185
3 0.179699396 0.032291873 0.022954038 0.327106919
4 0.199624333 0.039849875 0.023236240 0.359398792
5 0.224918499 0.050588331 0.023609300 0.399248667
6 0.258270264 0.066703529 0.024128424 0.449836998
7 0.304687500 0.092834473 0.024907785 0.516540527
8 0.375 0.140625 0.026234235 0.609375
9 0.5 0.25 0.029149150 0.75
10 1 1 0.058298299 1
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t pt f(pt) E0[f(p∗
t)] Et[C]
1 0.200609649 0.008073381 0.008073381 0.104585932
2 0.216904170 0.010204781 0.008157604 0.120732694
3 0.236316697 0.013197243 0.008261464 0.141142257
4 0.259903612 0.017556460 0.008393132 0.167536743
5 0.289293373 0.024211152 0.008566252 0.202649663
6 0.327163966 0.035018408 0.008805665 0.251071967
7 0.378338133 0.054155223 0.009162529 0.321108782
8 0.452806000 0.092840296 0.009764854 0.429419228
9 0.577350269 0.192450090 0.011076146 0.615099821
10 1 1 0.024324905 1
Ta b l e 3: γ = 3.
t pt f(pt) E0[f(p∗
t)] Et[C]
1 0.278513901 0.001675847 0.001675847 0.023382131
2 0.298148091 0.002355918 0.001699762 0.030085519
3 0.321121843 0.003414674 0.001729110 0.039509191
4 0.348458374 0.005137532 0.001766118 0.053167886
5 0.381688940 0.008101172 0.001814493 0.073718014
6 0.423246156 0.013582043 0.001880960 0.106122704
7 0.477334268 0.024780671 0.001979329 0.160450877
8 0.552233245 0.051358548 0.002144084 0.259573562
9 0.668740305 0.133748061 0.002500163 0.465007756
10 1 1 0.006192264 1
Ta b l e 4: γ = 5.WEINSCHENK: INCREASING WORKLOAD IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT 8
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